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1 Introduction
Internal conicts over government policies often threaten the stability of a country.
Indeed, dissatised regions of the country may attempt to secede, if the economies of scale
brought by unity are overweighed by the benets of forming a separate entity (in which
the level of internal confrontation is reduced, or eliminated altogether). In many cases,
these conicts are created by the lack of uniformity in citizenspreferences over the range of
government policy choices and/or distinctions across ethnic, religious, historical or linguistic
lines. Thus, stability of the country is linked to the distribution of its citizenspreferred
policies or characteristics.
How stability of the country should be measured? We suggest to measure it by means
of stability threshold. This index quanties the minimal returns to size that are su¢ cient to
prevent credible secession threats. An alternative interpretation of the stability threshold is
that of the minimal burden that can be imposed on the country (and all regions, provided
they decide to secede) which still guarantees its unity.
Our notion of stability, that requires secession-proofness of the country in the face
of internal conicts, e¤ectively ties stability with the precise form of the societys conict-
inducing diversity, represented by the distribution of citizenspreferences and characteristics.
Thus, the stability threshold can also serve as a measure of severity of internal conicts.1
This last concept has already been quantied by Esteban and Ray (1999), as the total
equilibrium expenditure by individuals on internal struggle (aimed at promoting their own
most preferred alternative). But we think that it is also natural to take a complementary
view and assess the severity of a conict by the strength of secession threats that this conict
generates. This strength is faithfully represented by the stability threshold, or the size of
overall resources that can prevent or at least mitigate secession sentiment.
1For the literature on greed-based conicts motivated by competition over resources see Grossman
(1991), Gershenson and Grossman (1999), Caselli and Coleman (2002).
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Severity of internal tension has been linked in the literature to polarization of the distribu-
tion of citizenspreferences and characteristics. The common belief (Esteban and Ray (1994,
1999), Duclos et al. (2004)) is that raising the degree of polarization increases the probability
of internal conicts, which should thus make secession threats by the countrys dissatised
regions more severe. It therefore seems proper to check this hypothesis, by enquiring into
the relation between the degree of countrys polarization and its stability threshold (which
as was said is also a measure of severity of internal conicts).
Our main nding is that, somewhat counter-intuitively, the relation between polariza-
tion and the stability threshold is ambiguous. Recall (Esteban and Ray (1994)), that the
concept of polarization is based on the existence of several population clusters with rela-
tive homogeneity of preferences within clusters and substantial heterogeneity across clusters.
The overall measure of polarization is then determined by the following two factors. The
rst is the level of heterogeneity inside each cluster (for a given number of clusters), that
represents the degree of polarization and conict between existing population groups: the
less heterogeneous each cluster is, the more polarized is the society at large. The second
is reected by the number of clusters in the society, when a smaller (but greater than one)
number of clusters represents a higher degree of confrontation (and polarization) in the so-
ciety. Dependence of the polarization index on the rst factor will be called xed-clusters
polarization e¤ect (FCPE), and on the second factor variable-clusters polarization e¤ect
(VCPE). Our basic conclusions are as follows:
 The stability threshold of a country is positively correlated with the FCPE.
 The link between the stability threshold and VCPE is ambiguous.
 The impact of VCPE is su¢ ciently strong so that the combined e¤ect of FCPE and
VCPE is ambiguous as well.
 However, there is positive correlation between the stability threshold and the polariza-
tion when the polarization is low, which happens when the number of clusters is su¢ ciently
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large and each cluster is su¢ ciently heterogeneous.
The somewhat unexpected behavior of the stability threshold with respect to VCPE is
due to the following reason. Existence of a centrally-locatedcluster (the one where the
preferences fall in, or close to, the center of the political map) can make secessions more
di¢ cult compared to the situation when the center is vacant. This is because the central
cluster benets the most from being in a united country (since the chosen policy would
typically be geared towards the mediancitizen). It may therefore be costly to persuade
this cluster to join a seceding region (if it is too small to prot from secession by itself), or the
citizens of that region may actually favor unity because then they can demand compensation
from the politically-satised central cluster. Thus, the stability threshold may increase when
the countrys population undergoes a division into more clusters (although located closer to
each other) and the center becomes vacant, despite a decrease in polarization. This, as was
said, cannot happen in the case of FCPE, and also not when the population preferences are
distributed very uniformly across their range.
The behavior of the Esteban and Ray (1999) measure of societal conict also exhibits a
certain lack of monotonicity with respect to changes in polarization of a multi-cluster society.
However, their focus is, to a certain degree, on contests (where individuals have utility
only from their most preferred alternative). In their model, the only option at an individuals
disposal consists of lobbying for the acceptance of his ideal policy, without the possibility of
a secession. Our analysis captures a di¤erent aspect of a conict the strength of secession
threats that it generates and shows a certain divergence between it and the polarization
index of the society, as we explained above. However, in spite of the di¤erences between the
framework of Esteban and Ray (1999) and our set-up, both approaches converge in their
analysis of the xed-cluster e¤ect. Indeed, for a given number of clusters (three in Esteban
and Ray (1999)) both indices of conict severity are positively correlated with the degree of
dissimilarity between the clusters, and, thus, represent reasonable indicators for the intensity
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the conict at hand.
In the second part of the paper we examine the situation where the stability threshold
has not been achieved and the country faces a break-up. We then examine the stable number
of countries, i.e., the number of independent entities into which the given united country
should be broken in order to eliminate credible threats of secession.2 We nd that the stable
number of countries also behaves non-monotonically with respect to polarization indices.
However, monotonicity does appear when the stable number is large, and the stable number
decreases when polarization rises.
Like Esteban and Rays paper, this manuscript aims to o¤er a theoretical
contribution to the comparative statics of social equilibrium : how the equi-
librium of a particular set of social institutions responds to modications of
one or several societal parameters describing the community under scrutiny. It
sheds light on the di¢ culties attached to the question and show that "natural"
monotonicity properties should be considered with caution. These questions
have been also investigated from an empirical perspective. In a model similar
to the one considered in this paper, but with two policy dimensions instead of
one (both the type and the quantity of the public good have to be selected),
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) show that the quantity of public good in the
social equilibrium resulting from sequential majority voting is inversely related
to the median distance to the median that they consider as being an indicator of
polarization of preferences. They test this implication with three data sets (U.S.
cities, U.S. metropolitan areas and U.S. urban counties) and bring evidence that
ethnic conict and fragmentation (there, they use the ethnic fractionalization
index) is an important determinant of local public nance. Alesina, Baqir and
Hoxby (2004) investigates the relationship between the number of jurisdictions
2See Alesina and Spolaore (1997) in the case of the uniform distribution of citizenscharacteristics.
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and various measures of social heterogeneity in a model which builds on Alesina
and Spolaore. They test the model using American school districts, school at-
tendance areas, municipalities and special districts and nd strongevidence of
the impact of social and income heterogeneity but little evidence for ethnic or
religious heterogeneity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the formal model of a country
with heterogeneous citizens and the denition of stability threshold. In Section 3 we discuss
the notion of polarization. Our results on the link between stability and polarization are
presented in Section 4, whereas Section 5 studies stability in the multi-country framework
and its relation to polarization. The proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
We consider a country W with a population of total mass 1, whose citizens have pref-
erences over the unidimensional policy space given by the interval I = [0; 1]. Citizens have
symmetric single-peaked preferences over the set I; and we identify each citizen with her
ideal point (and thus W  I). The distribution of all ideal points (and, thus, of all citizens
preferences) is given by a cumulative distribution function F with density f , dened over I.
The country W chooses a policy in the policy space I. In this paper, as in Alesina and
Spolaore (1997) and Le Breton and Weber (2003), we adopt a spatial interpretation of the
model by identifying a policy with the physical location of the government, so we do not
distinguish between geographical and preference dimensions. The country W has to cover
the cost of provision of public good, or government cost, c. We assume that the government
costs are the same for all regions, and if a region secedes from W, it will have to cover the
same cost c. For simplicity, we restrict our analysis of possible secessions regions that consist
of the union of a nite number of closed intervals in W.
Suppose now that an individual t belongs to the set S, which could be either the unied
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country (S = W) or a seceding region (S  W), and whose government chooses a location
p 2 I. Then the disutility or transportationcost d(t; p); incurred by individual t from the
choice of p; is determined by the distance between t and the government location p and we
shall assume that:
d(t; p) = jt  pj:
Now denote
D(S; p) =
Z
S
d(t; p)f(t)dt:
Then the value
D(S) = min
p2I
Z
S
d(t; p)f(t)dt
represents the minimal aggregate transportation cost incurred by the citizens of S:3
Under the linearity assumption, the aggregate transportation cost for every set S is
minimized when the government location chooses its location at the ideal point of its median
citizen, m(S), that satises
R
ft2Sjtm(S)g f(t)dt =
R
ft2Sjtm(S)g f(t)dt. Note that if S is an
interval and f is positive on S, then its median citizen is uniquely dened. However, if S
consists of several disjoint intervals, the median of S is not necessarily unique.
We now introduce the notion of S-cost allocation that determines the monetary contri-
bution of each individual t towards the cost of government c.
Denition 2.1: A bounded measurable function x dened on the set S  W is called an
S-cost allocation if it satises the budget constraint:Z
S
x(t)f(t)dt = c:
When the government location of S is at p, the total disutility of citizen t 2 S under
S-cost allocation x is:
d(t; p) + x(t):
3There always exists an optimal location of the government (see the next paragraph) and, therefore, the
cost function is well dened.
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We allow for lump sum transfers and do not restrict the mechanism of sharing costs in
any way. Thus every region S that contemplates secession, could take into account only its
total cost of being a separate country, given by the sum of government and transportation
costs, in estimating its future gains:
c+D(S):
If region S (which is, to recall, a union of a nite number of subintervals of I) can make
its members better o¤ than under the central government, then S is said to be prone to
secession:
Denition 2.2: Consider a pair (p; x), where p is the location of national government and
x is a W-cost allocation. We say that region S is prone to secession (given (p; x)) ifZ
S
(d(t; p) + x(t))f(t)dt > D(S) + c:
If no region is prone to secession, then the pair (p; x) is called secession-proof. The
country is called stable if there exists a secession-proof pair (p; x).
We now introduce stability threshold or unity index that quanties the minimal returns
to size that are su¢ cient to prevent credible secession threats. As we mentioned in the
introduction, this threshold can be viewed as the minimal burden on the country which still
guarantees its unity. It is quite easy to observe that the notions of stability and secession-
proofness are closely linked to the cost of public good. Indeed, a high cost of public good
may facilitate regional cooperation and mitigate a threat to instability posed by regions. On
the other hand, a low cost of public goods could reduce incentives for economic unity and
raise the intensity of secession threats. Formally,
Proposition 2.3: For a given distribution of ideal points F , there is a cut-o¤ value of
government costs cst(F ) such that the country is stable (according to Denition 2.1) if
and only if c  cst(F ).
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The value cst(F ) is called the stability threshold of F . Thus, for any given government
cost c  cst(F ); the country is stable: there exists a government location p and a W-cost
allocation x such that no region is prone to secession given (p; x). But, if c < cst(F ); the
country is unstable: there exists no secession-proof pair (p; x):
The natural question we address in this paper is the investigation of the link between
the stability threshold a degree of the countrys polarization. In order to do so, in the next
section we proceed with examination of polarization index.
3 Polarization Index
Indices of polarization, introduced in Esteban and Ray (1994), Duclos, et al. (2004) Tsui
and Wang (2000), are based on the notions of identication within ones own group and
alienation towards the others. For a continuous cumulative distribution function F on [0; 1],
Duclos et al. (2004) have derived the following polarization index (F ):
(F ) =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
jx  yj f (x)1+ f(y)dxdy; (1)
where f is the density function of F , and the parameter  satises 0:25    1: If F is a
discrete distribution supported on the set fx0; : : : ; xng ; and pi is the probability of xi, the
index (derived by Esteban and Ray (1994)) is given by
(F ) =
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
p1+i pj jxi   xjj ; (2)
where the parameter  belongs to the interval [0; ], where   1:6. To cover both innite
and nite cases, we assume throughout the rest of the paper that 0:25    1, so that both
(1) and (2) hold.
As alluded to in the introduction, our analysis of conicts will be performed under the
assumption that citizens ideal points form several disjoint clusters (that represent geo-
graphical regions or groups with similar political views). This will highlight the following
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two attributes of conict situations (in addition to the existence of clusters). The rst is
heterogeneity of preferences within clusters, which represents conicts within each region or
group. The second is reected by the number of distinct groups within the society, when a
smaller (but greater than one) number of clusters represents a higher degree of confrontation.
In order to focus solely on these two factors and eliminate other e¤ects, we shall consider a
family of step distribution functions with the support over a nite number of equal intervals
(clusters). We shall also assume complete uniformity of the distribution of citizens ideal
points within each cluster. Thus, all distributions in our class F will be characterized by
two parameters, the number of clusters, n and their length, a.
Formally, let an integer n  2 and the parameter a 2 (0; 1
n
] be given. Consider a function
fn;a on the unit interval [0; 1]:
fn;a(t) =

1
na
if t 2 [j 1 a
n 1 ; j
1 a
n 1 + a] for j = 0; 1; : : : ; n  1
0 otherwise:
That is, fn;a is the density function of the distribution which is supported and uniform on
the n intervals of length a, removed from each other by the same distance. Denote the
corresponding distribution by Fn;a. We also introduce fFn;0g for n  2, which is a discrete
limiting distribution of fFn;ag for a 2 (0; 1n ]. That is, Fn;0 is supported, and is uniform, on
the nite set that consists of n equidistant points f0; 1
n 1 ;
2
n 1 ; : : : ;
n 1
n 1 = 1g.
Now, as in Duclos et al. (2004), let 0:25    1; and denote (n; a)  (Fn;a). We
have the following expression for the polarization index:
Proposition 3.1:
(n; a) =
  
1
na
 n+1 na
3n
; if a > 0 
1
n
 n+1
3n
; if a = 0:
(3)
Obviously, the distribution Fn;a becomes less polarized when a or n increase:
Corollary 3.2: The polarization index (n; a) declines in each of its two variables.
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According to our interpretation in the introduction, the dependence of (n; a) on a
describes the xed-clusters polarization e¤ect (FCPE), while its dependence on n reects
the variable-clusters polarization e¤ect (VCPE). Thus, both e¤ects reduce the polarization
index:
It is worth pointing out that the index  exhibits discontinuity in the transition from
continuous distributions Fn;a for a > 0 to Fn;0: lim&0 (n; a) = 1: The reason is that
according to this index discrete distributions are innitely more polarized than continuous
ones (due to the presence of innitely dense clusters in former). The index still allows
comparisons of discrete distributions fFn;0g, via (3), but they belong to a di¤erent (higher)
league of polarization when it comes to comparing them with continuous distributions fFn;ag.
The index should not therefore be used for comparisons across these two subfamilies of
distributions, but only for comparisons inside each subfamily.
4 The Linkage between the Stability Threshold and
Polarization
In this section we study how the stability threshold reacts to changes in polarization.
First, we explicitly calculate the stability threshold for the distributions in our class. For
every function Fn;a 2 F we shall use a notation cst(n; a) instead of cst(Fn;a).
Proposition 4.1: For n  2; a 2 [0; 1
n
]; the stability threshold cst(n; a) is given by:
cst(n; a) =
1
8
(1 + (1  an)1 +
4
n
([n+2
4
]  [n+1
4
])
2[n 1
2
] + 1
);
where [x] stands for the integer part of x, i.e., for the largest integer that does not
exceed x.
We now turn to our conclusions:
Proposition 4.2: (i) The stability threshold is positively correlated with FCPE. That is,
the increase in a for xed n reduces both the polarization index and the stability
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threshold.
(ii) The link between the stability threshold and VCPE is ambiguous. That is, while
an increase in n reduces the polarization index (n; a), it does not necessarily reduce,
or increase, the stability threshold cst(n; a) for xed a.
(iii) The VCPE is strong enough to make the combined e¤ect of FCPE and VCPE
on the stability threshold ambiguous as well. That is, even if both n and a increase,
thereby reducing the polarization index (n; a); this does not necessarily reduce, or
increase, the stability threshold cst(n; a):
Thus, in general, the relationship between polarization and stability is not monotone.
According to Proposition 4.2, the stability threshold of Fn;a decreases with the increase
of a (and the implied fall in the distributions polarization) for xed n, but, in general, is not
monotone in (n; a) for a given a: To illustrate this point, consider the nite case a = 0 and
denote by S(n; t) the set of citizens that for given n are located at t. As it is shown in the
proof of Proposition 4.2, the rst deviation from monotone decline of cst(n; 0) in n occurs
when n = 6. Indeed, cst(6; 0) = 1
6
> cst(5; 0) = 3
20
: The reason for this spike, alluded to
in the introduction, can be explained as follows. When n = 5; the central clusterS(5; 1
2
)
(which does not exist when n = 6) makes secessions di¢ cult. Indeed, in the united country
scenario the optimally chosen government location is also at the center4: The existence of a
relatively big central cluster (which incurs zero transportation cost) has a mitigating e¤ect
on the aggregate transportation cost burden. And, if we consider the sets S(5; 0)[S(5; 1
4
) or
S(5; 3
4
)[S(5; 1),5 none has a central blockwith zero transportation cost. This means that
these regions would incur quite high transportation costs in the case of secession. However,
the situation changes drastically when n = 6: In this scenario, there is no central cluster
4It is easily to verify that, under the linearity assumption, in a secession-proof pair (p; x) the government
location p must be the ideal point of the median citizenm(I) = 12 :
5Our proofs indicate that only these subintervals and their complements play a role in determination of
Ws stability see Lemma A.2 in the Appendix.
12
in I to mitigate aggregate transportation cost; on the other hand, each of the secession-
relevantregions S(6; 0)[S(6; 1
5
)[S(6; 2
5
) or S(6; 3
5
)[S(6; 4
5
)[S(6; 1) have central clusters
which help to reduce transportation costs in the case of secession. This makes secession
more likely and the country less stable for F6;0; compared to the more polarized distribution
F5;0. (This argument can only be made for the switch from n = 4m + 1 to 4m + 2 for
a positive integer m. Indeed, we only observe upward jumps in cst(n; 0) at n = 4m + 2
as the proof of Proposition 4.2 will show. To see why the argument cannot be extended,
consider for instance the case of n = 3; 4: When n = 3; aggregate transportation costs are
mitigated by the central cluster, S(3; 1
2
), but the extreme clusters S(3; 0) and S(3; 1) would
now incur no transportation costs in case of secession, and so are relatively less deterred
from seceding compared to the case of n = 5: And when n = 4; there is no central cluster to
mitigate the transportation cost, but S(4; 0)[S(4; 1
3
) or S(4; 2
3
)[S(4; 1) do not have central
clusters either, which reduces their incentives to secede compared to the case of n = 6: By
Proposition 4.1, here cst(4; 0) = 1
6
= cst(3; 0); and so indeed the less polarized country is not
less stable.)
It is worthwhile to note that, for a positive xed a; the decline of cst(n; a) in n is restored
if the value of n is large enough (and thus polarization is low):
Proposition 4.3: For every 0 < a < 1, there exists a value n(a) such that cst(n1; a) 
cst(n2; a) whenever n1 > n2 > n(a) and n1a  1:
5 The Stable Number of Countries and Polarization
Indices
When the government cost is low, W is no longer stable (Proposition 2.3) and could
be broken up into smaller entities. The question we analyze in this section is what is the
number of smaller countries that could guarantee the stability of partition of W:
Denition 5.1: Consider a partition (S1; : : : ; Sm) ofW intom countries, anm-tuple of pairs
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((p1; x1); : : : ; (pm; xm)), where pi is the government location in Si and xi is an Si-cost
allocation. We say that region S is prone to secession (given ((p1; x1); : : : ; (pm; xm))) if
mX
i=1
Z
S\Si
(d(t; pi) + xi(t))f(t)dt > D(S) + c:
If no region is prone to secession, then the m-tuple ((p1; x1); : : : ; (pm; xm)) is called
secession-proof. The partition (S1; : : : ; Sm) is called stable if there exists a secession-
proof m-tuple ((p1; x1); : : : ; (pm; xm)).
Proposition 5.2 below follows from the main result in Haimanko et al. (2004):
Proposition 5.2: For a given distribution of ideal points F 2 F and the government cost
c > 0, there exists a stable partition (S1; : : : ; Sn) of W.
In particular, when c  cst (n; a) ; the trivial partition of W (consisting of W itself) is
stable.
Denote by K(c; n; a) the maximal number of countries in a stable partition of I (when
the distribution of ideal points is fn;a and the government cost is c); and by K(c; n; a) 
the minimal number of countries. For simplicity, we will focus attention on K(c; n; a) =
K(c; n; a); all our observations apply to K(c; n; a) just as well. We shall call K(c; n; a) the
stable number of countries. It is natural to ask how it is a¤ected by the change in (n; a);
the polarization degree of fn;a.
First, it turns out that K does not, in general, behave monotonically in the polarization
degree. Indeed, pick c0 2
 
3
20
; 1
6

: Then, since cst(4; 0) = cst(6; 0) = 1
6
> c0; and cst(5; 0) =
3
20
< c0 (these computations were made in the proof of Proposition 4.2), we have
K(c0; 4; 0); K(c0; 6; 0) > 1; and K(c0; 5; 0) = 1:
Moreover, since cst(n; a) is continuous in a for a xed n, for all positive and su¢ ciently small
a4; a5; and a6
K(c0; 4; a4); K(c0; 6; a6) > 1; and K(c0; 5; a5) = 1:
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Consequently:
Corollary 5.3: The stable number of countries is not monotone in the polarization degree.
That is, while a simultaneous increase of both n and a reduces the polarization index
(n; a); it does not necessarily decrease, or increase, the stable number K(c; n; a) for
a given c.
The example on which this corollary is based utilizes relatively high values of c. It
turns out that for low values of c the stable number does behave monotonically in the
polarization index: it decreases with polarization, as we show in Proposition 5.4. Intuitively,
this reects the fact that in a very polarized society each cluster is relatively uniform, and
hence, when separated from others, can exist as a separate and stable country even when
the government cost is very low. Thus, for a wide range of low c, highly polarized I should
not be split into more countries than there are clusters, which keeps the stable number
bounded. However, when the society is not polarized, and its members preferences are
spread uniformly, low c necessitates a very ne partition to achieve stability, because of the
wide spread of preferences.
Proposition 5.4: Given two integers 2  n1  n2 and 0  a1  a2  1n2 , there exists
c (n1; n2; a1; a2) > 0 such that for every 0 < c  c (n1; n2; a1; a2) ;
K(c; n1; a1)  K(c; n2; a2):
6 Appendix
We start with the following lemma:
Lemma A.1: If k; n are integers with 1  k  n  1, then for the distribution Fn;0
D([0;
k
n  1]) =
(

k
2

+ 1)(k   k
2

)
n(n  1) :
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Proof: Clearly
D([0;
k
n  1]) = D([0;
k
n  1];
1
2
k
n  1) =
2
n
(
1
2
k
n  1   0)
+
2
n
(
1
2
k
n  1  
1
n  1) + : : :+
2
n
(
1
2
k
n  1  

k
2

n  1)
=
2
n
1
2
k
n  1(

k
2

+ 1)  2
n(n  1)

1 + 2 + : : : :+

k
2

=
(

k
2

+ 1)(k   k
2

)
n(n  1) :
Our second lemma provides a computational formula for the unity index of distributions
in F . Its proof relies on the result of Haimanko et al. (2004), stating that stability of the
country is equivalent to its e¢ ciency (the country is e¢ cient if the total cost6 incurred by
its citizens is minimized when it is a united entity), and Proposition 3.3 of Haimanko et
al. (2005), according to which the country is e¢ cient if and only if splitting it into two
independent regions does not decrease the total cost.
Lemma A.2: For every distribution Fn;a 2 F
cst (n; a) = max
s2[0;1]
[D(I) D([0; s]) D([s; 1])]
= D(I)  min
s2[0;1]
[D([0; s]) +D([s; 1])].
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Note that for  = 0, the index 0 dened by (1) for Fn;a
with a > 0 and by (2) Fn;0 is precisely the Gini inequality index. It is not a polarization
index but it would be useful in our derivations. The index 0(n; a) is simply the expected
distance between two random points in I; each chosen according to Fn;a and independently
6Obviously, this cost has two components: the aggregate transportation cost, and the government cost.
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of the other one. We claim that 0(n; 0) =
n+1
3n
for every n. Indeed, clearly
0(n+ 1; 0) =
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
1
(n+ 1)2
 in   jn

= 2
nX
i=0
i
n(n+ 1)2
+
n 1X
i=0
n 1X
j=0
1
(n+ 1)2
 in   jn

=
1
n+ 1
+
n(n  1)
(n+ 1)2
0(n; 0):
And
0(n; 0) =
n+ 1
3n
(4)
obviously satises this recursive relation, with the initial condition 0(2; 0) =
1
2
: It is also
clear that
0(n;
1
n
) =
1
3
(5)
(recall that Fn; 1
n
is the uniform distribution). Further, it follows from the denition of Gini
index as the expected distance between two random points that 0(n; ) is an a¢ ne function
of a for xed n, and therefore (4) and (5) imply that
0(n; a) =
n+ 1  na
3n
:
To shift from 0(n; a) to (n; a) for positive values of , notice that
(n; a) =

1
na

0(n; a):
Thus,
(n; a) =

1
na

n+ 1  na
3n
and
(n; 0) =

1
n

n+ 1
3n
:
Proof of Proposition 4.1: Note that the assertion of the proposition can be restated
as follows:
17
(i) if n = 4m for m  1; then
cst(n; a) =
m
2(4m  1) (1  a) ; (6)
(ii) if n = 4m+ 1 for m  1; then
cst(n; a) =
2m+ 1
4(4m+ 1)
  a
8
; (7)
(iii) if n = 4m+ 2 for m  0; then
cst(n; a) =
2m2 + 2m+ 1
2(4m+ 1)(2m+ 1)
  a 2m+ 3
4(4m+ 1)
; (8)
(iv) if n = 4m+ 3 for m  0; then
cst(n; a) =
m+ 1
2(4m+ 3)
  a
8
: (9)
We rst prove the equalities for the case of a = 0: Start with (6), when n = 4m: Note that
the minimum of D([0; s])+D([s; 1]) is attained at s = 1
2
(or at any other point between 2m 1
4m 1
and 2m
4m 1). Indeed, if (say)
k 1
4m 1  s < k4m 1 < 2m 14m 1 , then the following holds:
D([0; s]) +D([s; 1]) = D([0;
k   1
4m  1]) +D([
k
4m  1 ; 1])
= D([0;
k   1
4m  1];
k   1
2(4m  1)) +D([
k
4m  1 ; 1];
1
2
+
k   1
2(4m  1))
> D([0;
k
4m  1];
k   1
2(4m  1)) +D([
k + 1
4m  1 ; 1];
1
2
+
k   1
2(4m  1))
 D([0; k
4m  1]) +D([
k + 1
4m  1 ; 1])
 min
s2[0;1]
[D([0; s]) +D([s; 1])]:
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Therefore
cst(4m; 0) = D(I)  min
s2[0;1]
[D([0; s]) +D([s; 1])]
= D(I) D([0; 1
2
]) D([1
2
; 1])
= D(I) D([0; 2m  1
4m  1]) D([
2m
4m  1 ; 1])
= D(I)  2D([0; 2m  1
4m  1]) = (using Lemma A.1)
=
m
4m  1   2
m
4(4m  1) =
m
2(4m  1) ;
which establishes (6) for n = 4m and a = 0:
Next, we consider the rest of the scenarios when a = 0: Similarly to the previous case,
cst(4m+ 1; 0) = D(I)  min
s2[0;1]
[D([0; s]) +D([s; 1])]
= D(I) D([0; 2m  1
4m
]) D([2m
4m
; 1])
= D(I) D([0; 2m  1
4m
]) D([0; 2m
4m
])
=
(2m+ 1)2m
(4m+ 1)4m
  m
2
(4m+ 1)4m
  (m+ 1)m
(4m+ 1)4m
=
2m+ 1
4(4m+ 1)
;
and (7) is also established. Further,
cst(4m+ 2; 0) = D(I)  min
s2[0;1]
[D([0; s]) +D([s; 1])]
= D(I) D([0; 2m
4m+ 1
]) D([2m+ 1
4m+ 1
; 1])
= D(I)  2D([0; 2m
4m+ 1
])
=
(2m+ 1)2
(4m+ 2)(4m+ 1)
  2 m(m+ 1)
(4m+ 2)(4m+ 1)
=
2m2 + 2m+ 1
2(4m+ 1)(2m+ 1)
;
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which shows (8). And nally,
cst(4m+ 3; 0) = D(I)  min
s2[0;1]
[D([0; s]) +D([s; 1])]
= D(I) D([0; 2m
4m+ 2
]) D([2m+ 1
4m+ 2
; 1])
= D(I) D([0; 2m
4m+ 2
]) D([0; 2m+ 1
4m+ 2
])
=
(2m+ 1)(2m+ 2)
(4m+ 3)(4m+ 2)
  m(m+ 1)
(4m+ 3)(4m+ 2)
  (m+ 1)
2
(4m+ 3)(4m+ 2)
=
m+ 1
2(4m+ 3)
;
and hence (9) is established as well.
It remains to prove the four equalities for fFn;agn2;a2(0; 1
n
] : Note that each such distribu-
tion is symmetric around 1
2
and satises GEM (the gradually escalating mediancondition,
set forth in Le Breton and Weber (2003). This condition requires that there be a (non-
decreasing) selection of a median, l(t); in every subinterval [0; t]; such that l0(t)  1 for
almost every t: And it obviously holds for every Fn;a for n  2; a 2 (0; 1n ]; since one can
consider
l(t) =
8>><>>:
t
2
; if t 2 k 1 a
n 1 ; k
1 a
n 1 + a

and k is even;
a
2
  1
2
1 a
n 1 +
t
2
; if t 2 k 1 a
n 1 ; k
1 a
n 1 + a

and k is odd;
k
2
1 a
n 1 +
a
2
; if t 2 k 1 a
n 1 + a; (k + 1)
1 a
n 1

and k is even;
t  k+1
2
1 a
n 1 ; if t 2

k 1 a
n 1 + a; (k + 1)
1 a
n 1

and k is odd.
According to Proposition 4.1 of Haimanko et al. (2005),
cst(n; a) =
1
2
  4
Z 1
2
l( 1
2
)
tfn;a(t)dt:
Due to the particular form of fn;a(t) and l(12); this implies that c
st(n; a) = q(n)a+r(n)+s(n) 1
a
:
However, since 0  cst(n; a)  1 for all a; it follows that cst(n; a) has the form
cst(n; a) = q(n)a+ r(n); (10)
i.e., it is an a¢ ne function of a for xed n. Equality (10) also holds when a = 0; since
the expression mins2[0;1][D([0; s]) + D([s; 1])] is continuous in the distribution F , as was
established in Lemma A.7 in Haimanko et al. (2004).
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Since Fn; 1
n
is uniform on [0; 1];
q(n)
1
n
+ r(n) = cst(n;
1
n
) = D(I)  2D([0; 1
2
]) =
Z 1
0
t  12
 dt  2Z 12
0
t  14
 dt = 18 :
We also know that
r(n) = q(n)  0 + r(n) = cst(n; 0);
and therefore
cst(n; a) = n(
1
8
  cst(n; 0))a+ cst(n; 0): (11)
Substituting the values of cst(n; 0) that have been computed above into the above equality
yields (6), (7), (8), and (9).
Proof of Proposition 4.2: (i). Follows immediately from Proposition 4.1 and Corollary
3.2.
(ii) and (iii). Consider the case where a = 0. When n increases, the distribution Fn;0
becomes less polarized and, in the limit, converges to the uniform distribution. The unity
index cst(n; 0) clearly converges to 1
8
as n!1: By Proposition 4.1, it decreases for low values
of n : cst(2; 0) = 1
2
; cst(3; 0) = 1
6
; cst(4; 0) = 1
6
; cst(5; 0) = 3
20
:However, cst(6; 0) = 1
6
> cst(5; 0);
and thus a spike in the unity index is observed on its way down to 1
8
; despite the decreasing
polarization and increasing uniformity of the distribution. This spike is recurrent: clearly,
cst(4m+ 1; 0); cst(4m+ 3; 0) < cst(4m+ 2; 0); (12)
and even
cst(4m  1; 0); cst(4m; 0)  cst(4m+ 2; 0) (13)
(equality occurs only for m = 1). Moreover, if a1; a2, and a3 are positive and su¢ ciently
small, the inequality
cst(4m+ 1; a1); c
st(4m+ 3; a2) < c
st(4m+ 2; a3) (14)
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holds as well, due to continuity of cst(n; a) for a xed n. This establishes (ii) and (iii) of the
proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4.3: Fix a > 0. Note that cst(n + 1; a)  cst(n; a) for all
feasible n; except possibly for those that have the form n = 4m+1. Consider the expression
cst(4m+ 2; a)  cst(4m+ 1; a). By Proposition 4.1, this di¤erence is equal to
1
8(4m+ 1)
(
2
2m+ 1
  5a):
Thus, cst(n+ 1; a)  cst(n; a)  0 for n > n(a), where n(a) = 4
5a
.
Proof of Proposition 5.4: This follows immediately from Proposition 3.1 of Haimanko
et al. (2004). Indeed, according to this proposition,
lim
c!0
K(c; n; a)
p
c =
1
2
Z 1
0
q
fn;a(t)dt =
1
2
p
na
if a > 0; and clearly
lim
c!0
K(c; n; 0) = n
if a = 0:
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